GitGuardian

A developer laptop gets popped. The board asks one thing: which credentials were on it? Most security teams need weeks of forensics to answer.

5x more secrets remediated year over year with the same team, and 80%+ lower MTTR (GitGuardian customer data). That’s what a dedicated function does.

For a long time at GitGuardian, we secured secrets where we assumed they lived: in the code. Attackers found a new target recently: developer laptops (and obviously vibe coder laptops) Every major supply-chain attack pushed them toward the place credentials actually pile up the developer laptop. Shell histories, .env files, CLI caches, and now AI agent configs from Cursor, Copilot and Claude Code. Our early-access data: ~40% of them are written there by the AI agents themselves, in terminal sessions, output logs and caches no repo scanner ever checks. So we built for the assumption every security team should make: These devices will be compromised. The only question is whether you'll know what was on it. Today we're shipping Developer Endpoint Protection, built into ggshield: → Limit the blast radius → Detect live attacks with honeytokens → Remediate at the source Find and remediate critical exposed credentials before attackers can steal them

Your security stack is doing its job. It just wasn’t built to see the credential layer underneath it. ▪ Your vault protects the secrets registered with it. ▪ EDR watches the endpoint. ▪ Code scanning covers the repos it can reach. ▪ CNAPP maps the cloud. But credentials move across all of them: pipelines, laptops, Slack, Jira, container images, public GitHub, AI agent configs. There is no fixed inventory or single system of record. Each tool sees its slice. Nobody sees the whole layer, and that’s the gap attackers exploit. See how to secure yours at gitguardian.com/platform

Your security stack is doing its job. It just wasn’t built to see the credential layer underneath it. ▪ Your vault protects the secrets registered with it. ▪ EDR watches the endpoint. ▪ Code scanning covers the repos it can reach. ▪ CNAPP maps the cloud. But credentials move across all of them: pipelines, laptops, Slack, Jira, container images, public GitHub, AI agent configs. There is no fixed inventory or single system of record. Each tool sees its slice. Nobody sees the whole layer, and that’s the gap attackers exploit. See how to secure yours at gitguardian.com/platform

𝗜𝘁 𝗹𝗼𝗼𝗸𝘀 𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘀𝘂𝗽𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗲𝗻. Verizon found credential abuse somewhere 𝗶𝗻 𝟯𝟵% 𝗼𝗳 𝗯𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲𝘀, the highest of any action across the breach progression. CrowdStrike found that once attackers get in, average eCrime breakout time is 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟵 𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘂𝘁𝗲𝘀. So the SOC gets the credential problem at the worst possible moment: when the attacker is already using it. The credential existed before the alert. In a repo. A pipeline. A developer laptop. A collaboration tool. Public code. An AI workflow. 𝗧𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗮𝘆𝗲𝗿. See it earlier: https://lnkd.in/ehXmiPge/?utm_campaign=2026-DACH&utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=paid&utm_id=826941976&hsa_acc=508656919&hsa_cam=826941976&hsa_grp=536500986&hsa_ad=1647209146&hsa_net=linkedin&hsa_ver=3